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We wrote a very early version of this paper 
in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on the 
UK’s Houses of Parliament in March 2017, 
during which a policeman and four tourists 
tragically lost their lives. A lone attacker 
drove down Westminster Bridge, running 
people over before stabbing a policeman 
at the gates at the House of Parliament. 
We recall this event all too well, as well as 
previous terrorist attacks in the UK, namely 
the 2005, 7 July bombings in London, 
whereby 52 people lost their lives and over 
700 were injured. Other terrorist attacks in 
the UK include the 2007 Glasgow airport 
attack, whereby a car filled with explosives 
was rammed into the doors of the main 
terminal; the London Bridge terrorist attack 
in 2018, where eight people died; and the 
Manchester Arena attack a few months 
later, whereby a lone attacker detonated a 
bomb that killed 22 people, some of whom 
were young fans of Ariana Grande who was 
PREVENT, safeguarding and the 
common-sensing of social work in the 
United Kingdom
David McKendrick1 and Jo Finch2
1
 Glasgow Caledonian 
University, Scotland
2
 University of East 
London, England 
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION:  The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) passed in the United 
Kingdom (UK) made it mandatory for social workers, as well as a wide range of caring 
professionals, to work within the PREVENT policy, originally introduced in 2002, as one strand 
of the UK’s overall counter-terrorism policy. 
METHOD: The paper  offers a theoretical account of how complex issues, like terrorism, that 
understandably impact on the safety and security of countries, are reduced to a series of 
assertions, claims and panics that centre on the notion of common sense. 
IMPLICATIONS: We theorise the concept of common sense and argue that such rhetorical 
devices have become part of the narrative that surrounds the PREVENT agenda in the UK, 
which co-opts social workers (and other public servants) into an increasingly securitised 
environment within the state. In other words, the appeal to common sense stifles critical debate, 
makes it hard to raise concerns and positions debates in a binary manner. We use the example 
of how there has been a decisive linking of traditional safeguarding social work practice with 
counter-terrorism activity. 
CONCLUSIONS: We posit that linkages such as this serve to advance a more closed 
society, resulting in a “chilling” of free speech, an increase in surveillance and the unchecked 
advancement of a neoliberal political agenda which promotes economic considerations over 
issues of social justice. This we argue, has implications for not only the UK, but for other 
countries where social workers are increasingly being tasked with counter-terrorism activities. 
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playing in concert that night. These were, 
and still are, difficult to understand and 
process for citizens and rightly cause fear 
and anxiety. Indeed, as residents of London 
and Glasgow, we share those continued 
anxieties about our safety and, like any other 
citizens, are broadly in favour of counter-
terrorism measures to ensure that those who 
wish to do harm in the name of religion 
or politics, are rightfully prevented from 
carrying out devastating terrorist attacks. 
What we increasingly note, however, are 
what we describe as thin and common-sense 
narratives that often dominate discussion 
about terrorism and how to prevent 
terrorism. Alongside this, such common-
sense narratives have also crept into social 
work policy and practice in the UK. We set 
about here to interrogate the UK’s counter-
terrorism policy, PREVENT, as a prime 
example of a common-sense narrative, and 
the detrimental impact this has on social 
work in particular. Accordingly, we critically 
explore PREVENT, by drawing on the works 
of Italian political philosopher, Antonio 
Gramsci, utilising his concepts of hegemony 
and common sense that are central to his 
thinking. Using the theoretical proviso of 
common-sense narratives, we will explore 
how the anxiety around terrorism and 
violent extremism, mobilises thin discourses 
that advance the aims of the neoliberal 
project embodied in Britain by the current 
government while, at the same time, eroding 
a desire for a more egalitarian society 
characterised by a more equal distribution of 
wealth and greater equality. 
Our key aim is to critically consider how 
such counter-terrorism policies may 
serve to reframe, and reduce the role and 
emancipatory tasks of social workers, while 
developing a new professional reality for 
social work driven by securitisation and 
surveillance, rather than traditional social 
work values of empowerment, liberation and 
conscientization. We will argue that social 
work professionals in UK and other Western 
democracies are increasingly being deployed 
as agents of state securitisation. We will 
explore the surreptitious methods by which 
this is facilitated and the ways in which 
policy and practice deploy series of objects, 
images and linguistic devices to promote a 
sense of global insecurity (Massumi, 2015) 
which restricts traditional sites for the 
development of empowering narratives 
central to social work practice. The article 
begins with a brief overview of the UK’s 
PREVENT policy in order to contextualise 
subsequent theoretical explorations. 
PREVENT
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack 
in the USA, many Western democracies, 
including the UK, subsequently revised 
their counter-terrorism policies. The UK’s 
overall counter-terrorism policy, known as 
CONTEST was introduced in 2003, with 
further amendments in 2009, 2011 and 2018. 
CONTEST covers what has become known 
as the “Four P’s”: Prevent, Pursue, Protect 
and Prepare. The PREVENT policy aims 
at, firstly, identifying those at risk of or 
suspected of extremism and radicalisation 
and, secondly, preventing people being 
drawn into terrorism. The Government’s 
definition of extremism is as follows:
Vocal or active oppositions to 
fundamental British Values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual 
liberty and mutual respect and tolerance 
of different faith and beliefs. We also 
include in our definition of extremism, 
calls for the death of members of our 
armed forces, whether in this country or 
overseas. (HM Government, 2014) 
And radicalisation is defined as the:
…process by which a person comes to 
support terrorism and forms of extremism 
leading to terrorism, committing terrorist 
acts either abroad or on home ground. 
(HM Government, 2014)
The PREVENT policy, however, was ramped 
up significantly when in July 2015, The 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) 
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came into force in the UK. This requires a 
number of specified agencies, including 
schools, colleges, prisons, local authorities, 
and higher education establishments 
to actively promote “British values” 
(McKendrick & Finch, 2016). It also places 
a legal duty on such professionals to work 
within the PREVENT agenda. In other 
words, such practitioners must now identify 
and report those deemed to be at risk of 
extremism and terrorism, possibly work with 
security services to assess the level of risk, 
and, provide services if required. 
For social workers, now under a statutory 
obligation to work within the PREVENT 
agenda, this poses distinct ethical challenge, 
not least of which is being caught up so 
decisively in the state’s security apparatus 
(Finch & McKendrick, 2015). We also note 
the co-opting of the term “safeguarding” 
within the PREVENT agenda which, in our 
view, deliberately attempts to frame such 
social work interventions in a benevolent, 
simplistic and common-sense manner. We 
now move on to consider the meaning of 
common sense, and how, a benign and 
everyday word is increasingly cynically 
and worryingly applied in complex social 
policy spheres.
Gramsci and common sense
The call for a common-sense approach 
is a familiar rallying cry from a range 
of neoliberal actors. For example, when 
Michael Gove was the UK Secretary of State 
in 2012, while extolling the virtues of early 
interventions in Children and Families work 
and the positive influence this could have on 
placing children for adoption, he called for 
social workers to deploy a common-sense 
approach to the issue of inter-racial adoption 
by placing black children with white families 
(UK Government, 2012). Further examples 
of politicians extolling the need for common 
sense include Boris Johnson who, in the 
BREXIT campaign, excused his own racist 
attitudes by suggesting it was common sense 
to feel afraid seeing a group of black youths 
when out running (Jeffries, 2016). 
Former UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
regularly invoked the notion of common 
sense in his speeches. For example, on 
one occasion urging social workers to use 
common sense when dealing with suspected 
cases of child abuse (Holeman, 2015) and in 
relation to Ashya King, a seriously ill child 
who was removed from hospital and taken 
abroad by his parents (against doctors’ 
advice), Cameron called for an “urgent 
outbreak of common-sense” (More-Briger, 
2014). Indeed, the common-sense rhetoric 
continues with Iain Duncan-Smith, referring 
to, at the time of writing, then current Prime 
Minister Theresa May’s remark about the 
need for tighter immigration controls after 
the Westminster attack as common sense 
(BBC News, 2017). 
The deployment of this particular phrase 
seems to indicate that there is some kind of 
sense that is held in common, an immutable, 
obvious, simple sense that is so obvious to 
everyone that it does not require description, 
qualification or explanation. Common sense 
in this particular idiom, suggests a set of 
ideals and values that are so recognisable, 
non-controversial, and straightforward, so 
widely shared and accepted, that there is no 
other realistic, viable alternative. The point 
of view described as common sense, is just 
so obvious and irrefutably true. Further, one 
who does recognise or deviates from this 
common-sense view, must be considered 
a potential risk to society. We suggest, 
however, that the concept of common sense 
needs urgent attention and critical analysis, 
because of its profligate and indiscriminate 
use in social work and other policy arenas. 
A critique of the concept of common sense 
is offered by Gramsci (1973). He describes 
common sense as a linguistic device used to 
support the existence of hegemony. Gramsci 
(1973) describes hegemony as the state 
of being where powerful elites, the state 
or juridical government, exercise “direct 
domination or command” (1973, p. 12) over 
the population, or as Gramsci referred to 
them, “subalterns” (1973, p. 12). Common 
sense is deployed by elites therefore, as a 
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disciplinary vehicle to ensure their position 
of power remains unchallenged, hence 
allowing it to remain secure and to be 
expanded. Subalterns are viewed with a 
sense of disdain and are seen as unlikely to 
challenge the ideas being suggested as they 
are delivered by those in power. To further 
maintain this hegemony, the development 
of a sense of “feeling as opposed to 
knowing” (1973, p. 418) is vital; hegemony 
requires a domination of the media and 
other methods of communication by those 
in power. Further, matters pertaining to 
national security are presented, using a 
performative narrative which utilises 
iconic imagery. 
If we relate this to events in London, 
immediately following the March 2017 
attack on Westminster Bridge and the 
Houses of Parliament referred to at the 
outset of this paper, images of the Houses 
of Parliament, Big Ben and red London 
buses were frequently deployed, while 
Parliament itself was described as the “cradle 
of democracy” by many news outlets in the 
UK and beyond. We noted that references to 
the Blitz were frequent, and the indomitable 
spirit of Londoners was a common theme 
across the reporting of the event (see for 
example, The Daily Mirror, 2017). While to 
some extent accurate (indeed, one of the 
authors of this paper who resides in London, 
was rather defiantly making statements of 
getting on with it and not being afraid when 
travelling on the London transport system 
the following day), such responses can also 
be seen as what Mayo (2008) describes as 
“distorted and fragmentary” (Mayo, 2008, 
p. 430) deliberately amplifying cultural 
references that evoke familiar and powerful 
remembrances, emphasising Britain as an 
island nation proud of its independence 
and resilience. These versions of events 
are mobilised and reinforced by powerful 
intellectuals and actors, including for 
example, the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, 
who proclaimed that the events were “an 
attack on the very heart of our democracy 
and the symbols of the values we cherish so 
much...” (UK Government, 2017). 
Gramsci described such processes as “diffuse 
uncoordinated features of a general form 
of thought common to a particular period 
and a particular popular environment” 
(1973, p. 300). In the case of the London 
attack, the reinforcement of hegemonic 
power through cultural iconography 
supports a narrative of resilience and 
stoicism, simultaneously providing 
reassurance while reinforcing a familiar 
uniqueness of British life. As a device, this 
set of linguistic and cultural references 
are deliberately deployed to reinforce to 
subalterns that hegemonic power is retaining 
control despite the reality of the current crisis 
and the threat of future attacks. A feature of 
hegemony is its control over the media and 
its ability to manage and co-ordinate a clear 
message which maintains the imbalance 
between hegemony and the subaltern masses. 
It is of interest to note that the development of 
social media has been a site of concern for the 
hegemony as it struggles to develop a means 
of control over a diffuse and novel method 
of communication. Whilst, in the context of a 
sustained series of terrorist attacks this may 
be understandable, it can also in the current 
circumstances, be seen as a retrenchment of 
privacy for all and an opportunity for the 
government to advance its involvement in 
the private lives of its citizens. Policies such 
as PREVENT and its proponents, employ 
such “distorted and fragmentary” narratives, 
as well as bring about surveillance and 
securitisation creep, which will usher in the 
potential demise of traditionally caring and 
emancipatory professions. 
Common sense and neoliberalism
In a more recent exploration of the politics 
of common sense, Hall and O’Shea (2015) 
describe it as:
…a form of “everyday thinking” which 
offers us frameworks of meaning 
with which to make sense of the 
world. It is a form of popular, easily-
available knowledge which contains 
no complicated ideas, requires no 
sophisticated argument and does not 
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depend on deep thought or wide reading. 
It works intuitively, without forethought 
or reflection. It is pragmatic and 
empirical, giving the illusion of arising 
directly from experience, reflecting only 
the realities of daily life and answering 
the needs of “the common people” for 
practical guidance and advice. (2015, p. 8)
In other words, common-sense explanations 
for complex world events for example, 
provide the populace with simple certainties. 
Equally, when politicians call for a common-
sense approach, this has a resonance with 
the populace, who can intuitively, and 
very easily, without thought or reflection, 
grasp, understand and make sense of such 
everyday problems and on the surface, 
simple and seemingly effective solutions 
to these potentially anxiety-provoking 
issues. Thin narratives are thus effectively 
employed. 
Hall and O’Shea (2015) argue that common-
sense narratives have been deployed, for 
example, as a vehicle to obviate the effects 
of the profligate behaviour of bankers and 
venture capitalist which resulted in the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 and, further, 
have been used as:
…an alibi for a far reaching and further 
restructuring of state and society 
along market lines with a raft of 
ideologically driven reform designed 
to advance privatisation and 
marketization. (2015, p. 11)
Furthermore, they contend that neoliberalism 
unfairly targets the most vulnerable in 
society in a process where the state bears the 
responsibility for the socialisation of debt 
accrued, while profits from this process (in 
the forms of bonuses for bankers gained 
as a result of the required restructuring 
following the crash) have been subsumed by 
private individuals or institutions. This has 
significant and worrying consequences for 
those who are experiencing vulnerability as 
public services suffer under the ideology of 
austerity. In real terms this sees brutal cuts to 
public service budgets resulting in significant 
losses to jobs and services. 
The application of this form of common 
sense creates a doctrine of competitive 
individualism where the accrual of wealth 
and power is seen to be located in the 
strength of character of the individual; the 
familiar call for the unemployed to “get on 
their bike” to look for work voiced by former 
UK Conservative MP Norman Tebbit in the 
1980s is rephrased and modernised into a 
strivers v skivers dichotomy favoured by 
Cameron and his former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne. In this febrile 
environment, the influence of wider political 
and social structures is ignored and those 
who are left behind in society are perceived 
as lacking in moral ability and courage. 
Standing (2011) argues that one result of this 
is that a new precariat class has emerged, 
one that is defined by mobility and its social 
and economic uncertainty. Referring to the 
neoliberal project, Standing (2011) states:
…it reveres competitiveness and 
celebrates unrestrained individual 
responsibility, with an antipathy 
to anything collective…The state’s 
role is seen as primarily setting and 
strengthening the rule of law. But the 
law has never been minimalist, as some 
neoliberals depict it. It is intrusive 
and orientated towards curbing 
nonconformity and collective action. 
(2011, p. 132)
In brief, the neoliberal regime needs, 
despite protestations to the contrary, an 
intrusive and strong government to ensure 
its ideology flourishes. Standing (2011) sees 
a significant shift from collectivist postwar 
welfare regimes to one that sees those with 
wealth and power increasing their global 
reach and power while those in poverty 
experience greater risk, insecurity and 
precarity. We are making the argument 
therefore, that the continuing penetration 
of neoliberal ideology is supported by the 
hegemonic creation of a common sense that 
asserts that there is no other way or, as has 
23VOLUME 31 • NUMBER 2 • 2019 AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND SOCIAL WORK
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
THEORETICAL RESEARCH
been a long-standing popular Conservative 
politician refrain, originally popularised 
by former Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne and then taken up by 
former Conservative Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, “we are all in this together” (see, 
for example, The Guardian, 2012). 
In a Gramscian view, the oppressive nostrums 
of neoliberalism thus curtail an alternative 
from emerging, and a series of straw men 
are created to divert the subalterns’ attention 
from the hegemony’s continued dominance. 
So, as we argue, a threat of terrorism, and 
those who perpetrate it, diverts attention 
away from increasing curtailment of civil 
liberties, increased surveillance, securitisation 
creep and the demonisation of particular 
communities or faith groups, namely, Muslim 
communities who become in effect, “straw 
men” and are “othered”. 
Hall and O’Shea (2015) argue further 
that the state is travelling in an explicitly 
neoliberal direction, one which emphasises 
a free individual, engaging with others, 
without government interference, through 
market transactions, scaffolded by images, 
ideas and linguistic devices which, when 
taken together, represent the hegemonic 
notion of common sense which supports 
the permeation of neoliberalism into every 
aspect of our society. As it can be seen, 
traditional collectivist ideas embodied in 
the welfare state of collectivism, strength 
in unity and the power of working-class 
movements are diminished through the 
establishment of new common sense 
vocabularies described by Massey (2015) as:
…the vocabularies which have 
reclassified roles, identities, and 
relationships – of people, places and 
institutions – and the practice which 
enact[s] them embody and enforce the 
ideology of neoliberalism, and thus a new 
capitalist hegemony. (2015, p. 26)
Having established the relationship 
between hegemony, common sense and 
neoliberalism, we return to the PREVENT 
agenda and give consideration to the role 
PREVENT plays in operationalising what 
Gandy (1993) described as the panoptic sort, 
a method of social surveillance developed 
by marketing professionals to identify and 
classify people who can then be targeted for 
particular goods or services. We will develop 
the argument that a policy like PREVENT is 
a natural consequence of the furthering of 
the neoliberal agenda, utilising a securitising 
narrative to create a non-problematic 
and common-sense relationship between 
safeguarding and radicalisation. 
Safeguarding, securitisation and 
radicalisation
Fergusson (2007) argues that recent 
developments in social work policy have 
seen a shift in the terrain, away from 
generalised notions of welfare towards 
more personalised approaches which see the 
individual as paramount. Fergusson (2007) 
argues that this comes about at the expense 
of more traditional social work notions that 
emphasise the centrality of structural issues 
that impact on the lives of individuals. He 
argues that this shift has supported the 
neoliberal tenet of the transfer of risk from 
the state to the individual, and, that this 
transfer is activated through policies such 
as personalisation. We would develop 
this further and suggest it can also be seen 
most decisively in policies like PREVENT. 
Giddens (1991) describes the concept of 
“ontological security” which is often used in 
international relations, and refers to a sense 
of mental stability that is derived from the 
security and familiarity of surroundings that 
can be challenged by chaotic, unpredictable 
and unexpected events. We advance the 
argument that, in the immediate aftermath 
of the Westminster attack, a similar set of 
events occurred which aimed to increase a 
sense of national ontological security; the 
apprehension and death of the attacker was 
an immediate action which eliminated the 
risk and the swift media led diffusion of 
iconic imagery, created a sense of familiarity 
which worked against the chaos of the 
attack. The use of iconic imagery by the 
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media and the promotion of a wartime spirit 
was mobilised as an evocative set of images 
and ideas which provided a sense of national 
familiarity and supported the reinstitution of 
a feeling of calm. 
Similarly, the development of PREVENT 
along familiar, and to some extent, social 
work, lines of safeguarding, provides both 
ontological security for practitioners and 
the general public alike and can be seen 
as related to a key neoliberal ideological 
underpinning, that of avoiding assigning 
responsibility to societal structures and 
deeply ingrained inequalities, but rather, 
emphasising the role of the individual. The 
term safeguarding was therefore decisively 
co-opted into policy pronouncements 
and the practices of PREVENT (Finch & 
McKendrick, 2019). Social workers’ (and 
other professionals’) statutory duty to 
work with PREVENT was promoted as 
part of normal, everyday safeguarding 
procedures. Likewise, the promotion by UK 
politicians of the similarities between online 
sexual groomers and online radicalisers 
for example, allowed a familiar notion 
of wickedness mediated through the 
internet; the virtual predator hiding on 
the internet setting a carefully laid trap to 
entice vulnerable young people into their 
world where they can be exploited for the 
nefarious purposes of the paedophile/
radicaliser. While we are in no way seeking 
to undermine this as a reality, we are seeking 
to develop a more carefully considered and 
critical discussion around the issues that this 
exposes. 
Ontological security depends, in no small 
way, on the establishment of a set of images, 
ideas and debates that the population 
can engage with in a way that is familiar, 
and therefore comfortable for them. It is 
our contention that there are significant 
differences between online radicalisation 
and online sexual exploitation. Primarily, 
those involved in online radicalisation 
would claim that they are motivated by 
religion, or a particular political ideology 
masked as religion, and a sense of political 
imperatives that relate in some way to the 
actions of Western colonialism. Online 
sexual exploitation does not exist in these 
dimensions; rather it relates to a desire 
for sexual and personal gratification 
that connects to a sense of power (or 
powerlessness). We strongly suggest 
that policies that seek to reduce online 
radicalisation and online grooming need 
to tread a careful path that ensures they 
take into account these subtle differences 
in application and motivation. An urgent 
need exists therefore, to ensure that policies 
such as PREVENT are subject to a rigorous 
academic and professional discussion, as 
well as empirical research, particularly given 
the sensitivity of the issues involved and the 
vulnerability of those whose lives are affected 
by them, to appreciate the similarities and 
perhaps, more importantly, highlight the 
differences in both of them. We have noted 
for example, the paucity of literature within 
social work in the UK about PREVENT with 
only ourselves, Stanley and Guru (2015), and 
Stanley, Guru, and Gupta (2018) exploring 
this from a theoretical standpoint. 
PREVENT is a neoliberal policy that strongly 
emphasises the actions of individuals while 
downplaying the role of the state or other 
structural actors. To that end, its close 
relationship, and indeed, the deliberate 
adoption of traditionally welfarist social work 
terms such as safeguarding, should not allow 
for a situation where the issues are regarded 
as the same. As it stands, the current iteration 
of PREVENT with its emphasis on ontological 
security fits the safeguarding rhetoric 
perfectly, as it sees risk being constructed 
in intimate individual relationships and has 
little or no tangible connection with structural 
factors. This was recognised by Emerson 
(2016) in his role as Special Rapporteur on 
Terrorism when he observed that many states 
conceptualised radicalisation in an overly 
simplistic way that was:
…based on a simplistic understanding of 
the process as a fixed trajectory to violent 
extremism with identifiable markers 
along the way. (2016, p. 7)
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In other words, Emerson is arguing that 
the existing response to radicalisation lacks 
a depth of knowledge and understanding 
of the complexity of the issue at hand and 
so the resulting policies are unlikely to be 
the most effective method of intervention. 
Emerson (2016) goes on to say:
States have tended to focus on those 
[approaches] that are most appealing 
to them, shying away from the more 
complex issues, including political issues 
such as foreign policy and transnational 
conflicts. (2016, p. 7)
We concur with Emerson, as well as other 
academics for example, Kundani, (2015), 
Thomas, (2010) and Sabir (2017), that 
PREVENT is conceptually flawed, as it 
deliberately promotes an overly simplistic 
understanding of the complexity of the issue 
and, as we argue, deploys a common sense 
notion of “safeguarding as exactly the same 
as radicalisation” when they have, in our 
view, significant differences, most notably in 
the intrinsic motivation and indeed, agency, 
of those involved in the different activities. 
If we seek to impact the phenomena of 
radicalisation and online radicalisation 
then, we argue, that a Gramscian notion of 
“good sense” needs to be deployed, in that 
current responses are mired in the notion of 
“common sense”. 
Good sense requires recognition that, in a 
climate of panic where notions of ontological 
security are advanced, it is unlikely that 
the responses that are developed are well 
thought through and subject to discipline 
and rigour. The issue of radicalisation is 
thus multi-layered and presents in different 
ways in different individuals; however, in 
almost all cases, it is not solely located in 
the personal but has a significant connection 
with the political and structural (Kundani, 
2015; Sabir, 2017). Developing a meaningful 
challenge requires a careful consideration 
of how the structures that currently exist 
are equipped to manage the challenges 
represented by the issue of radicalisation. 
We will now go on to consider the existing 
arrangements for countering violent 
extremism and offer some considerations of 
their motivation and their effectiveness.
Countering violent extremism
Buzan (1983) argues that the individual is an 
“irreducible basic unit to which security can 
be applied” (1983, p. 243) which dovetails 
with the notion of individual responsibility 
that Ferguson (2007) referred to. We contend 
that, in the tense social and political climate 
that emerges in the aftermath of a terrorist 
attack, the influence of external, structural 
factors such as the political environment 
or the dominance of a particular economic 
model is understated. The outcome of this 
is that (potentially) legitimate societal issues 
become pathologised as individualised 
responses, and are not fully taken into 
account. Simultaneously, a deliberate 
obscuring of the responsibility that should be 
borne by the oppressor occurs and sees the 
oppressor presenting themselves as a victim 
of an “evil” often coming in the form of a 
seemingly unsolicited attack on a vulnerable, 
innocent population.
We argue that PREVENT promotes exactly 
this set of circumstances as it conceptualises 
the actions of those it focuses on as located 
out with any sphere of societal responsibility. 
PREVENT thus promotes a perception of 
the pathologised individual and operates 
in a pre-criminal space which places a 
requirement on public service workers, 
such as librarians, nurses, teachers and 
social workers to be attuned to the threat of 
radicalisation and to be aware of the referral 
mechanisms for people whom they suspect 
of becoming radicalised. As documented 
earlier, and unsurprisingly, PREVENT has 
come in for extensive criticism, operating as 
it does in a moral and ethical dimension that 
is at odds with the basic tenets of most of the 
caring professions required for its operation.
The universalism that is at the heart of 
PREVENT blurs the professional distinctions 
between those on the “front line” (Coppock & 
McGovern, 2014) of deradicalisation and 
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presumes that all public servants have the 
skills and, indeed, the opportunities to 
detect the so called “signs and symptoms” 
of radicalisation. This approach reminds the 
authors of early child protection training 
which provided student social workers 
with images of injuries sustained by 
children often at the hands of their parents 
and carers, and then provided lists of the 
so called “signs and symptoms”. This, 
while useful in an observational sense, is 
deeply personalised and did little to locate 
professionals in a place where they can 
challenge the social phenomenon of child 
protection. As the work of Featherstone, 
Morris, and White (2014), Parton (2014) 
and Garrett (2013) has identified, the issue 
of poverty is central to child protection, 
with such activity being more common in 
deprived environments. The “airbrushing” 
(McNicol, 2017) of structural factors from 
the gamut of professional responsibility of 
social workers paves the way for an increase 
in pathologised responses (such as signs of 
safety) as opposed to the development of a 
professional identity that sees social workers 
as agents of social change as well as agents of 
social control. Counter-radicalisation work 
offers a powerful example of the ascendance 
of pathologised responses that emphasise 
the personal over the impact of structural 
issues that are a result of the dominance of 
neoliberal ideology.
Social work exists in a demanding 
professional environment, external factors 
such as austerity and a national government 
that seems at odds with central tenets of 
social work activity such as collectivism and 
an awareness of geopolitical factors on the 
actions of individuals, are complicated by 
internal factors such as aggressive inspection 
regimes which have the power to remove 
social work activity from local government 
while ensuring that local government retains 
responsibility for any errors. Indeed, there 
exists a culture of moral hyper-regulation 
which sees professionals as “24/7” social 
workers (Banks, 2008; Petrie, 2009) required 
to uphold public trust and confidence in 
social work, the result of which is that social 
work and social workers are prevented from 
challenging neoliberalism or at least run the 
risk of referral to regulatory bodies should 
they do so on “competence” grounds.
Conclusion
We conclude by arguing that such securitised 
and so-called “common-sense” policies 
and practices are evidence of the increased 
prominence of neoliberalism in social work 
training, education and service delivery. 
As a result, significant importance is placed 
on the ontological security provided by a 
raft of performance measures, management 
information and recruitment and retention 
detail that are a cornerstone of the neoliberal 
project. These practices are introduced at 
the expense of ideas of the commons, public 
good, and the desire to see a better, more 
equal and fair society, all of which better 
accords with social work values in the 
UK, and as enshrined in the International 
Federation of Workers definition of the 
practices, purpose and values of social work. 
We argue that current social work practices 
are becoming embodied by the common 
sensing of social work are a form of 
deliberate, premeditated, hegemonic activity 
designed to increase a sense of ontological 
security underpinned by a form of neoliberal 
governmentality. At its core, this approach 
places deliberate emphasis on activities, 
methods of training and intervention 
techniques that are exclusory, placing a 
deliberate over-emphasis on a pathologised, 
individuated set of responses that deploy a 
particular interpretation of the role of social 
workers as professionals who “work on” 
rather than “work with” families, as well 
as the significant turn to target individuals. 
The structural factors that play such a 
significant role are airbrushed out in favour 
of a set of responses motivated by new 
public management and the “performance 
dashboard” has obscured the belief in 
radical emancipatory politically motivated 
social work. We note that PREVENT and its 
associated practices are an acute example 
of such a decisive move, with the duty to 
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safeguard, moving decisively away from 
a welfarist model, to one of securitised 
safeguarding. 
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